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M a r t i n  B .  K a l i n o w s k i
N E W  D E V E L O P M E N T S  I N  T H E  
V E R I F I C A T I O N  O F  N U C L E A R  A R M S
C O N T R O L
The nuclear arms control agenda is facing a deadlock. There are
still 20,000 to 30,000 nuclear weapons world-wide and most of
them are not yet covered by any arms control treaty. Both Rus-
sia and the USA have each at least 2,000 nuclear weapons still
on high alert.  This is enough for a nuclear exchange scenario
that could cause a nuclear winter effect which would be lethal
for many humans, animals and plants at least on the northern
hemisphere. Though the Moscow Treaty (SORT) was signed in
May 2002, it falls behind the substance of the START (Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty) process which it replaces since it does
not  include  any  means  of  verification.  The  Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is not in force yet, negotiations
for  the  Fissile  Materials  Cutoff  Treaty  (FMCT)  have not  even
started. A further setback was the declaration of the USA in 2005
that the FMCT should have no verification system.
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At the same time, verification related to horizontal nonpro-
liferation has made significant progress. During the intrusive
inspections in Iraq, new methods have been applied. The In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has gained a legal
foundation  for  enhanced  inspections  by  the  member  states
agreeing on the Additional Protocol in 1997. This has opened
the doors for  the nuclear inspections capabilities to  become
more effective and powerful. Unfortunately, reliance on nuclear
safeguards is  not  considered sufficient any more by several
states.  Horizontal  non-proliferation  politics  has  turned  to  a
more  aggressive  approach  of  counter-proliferation.  These
countries, in particular the United States, are following a path
of exerting more international pressure as well as threat and
the  use  of  military  power  in  order  to  enforce  international
nuclear norms. 
This tendency was enhanced by the exposure of the most
significant  gap and biggest  challenge for  verification of  nu-
clear  non-proliferation,  namely  the  detection  of  clandestine
weapons-usable materials  production. It  became obvious for
the first time with the shock caused by revealing the clandestine
nuclear weapons program in Iraq in 1990. The next blow was
the expellation of the IAEA inspectors by North Korea leaving
the IAEA with no means to verify whether this country is sep-
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arating plutonium. In 2002 Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities
have  become  known  and  were  then  put  under  on-site  in-
spections and while Iran promised not to build again any un-
reported facility, there are no verification means in place to
detect remotely any highly enriched uranium (HEU) or pluto-
nium production that an NPT member state might operate
somewhere clandestinely. 
This verification gap is causing distrust in the IAEA nuclear
safeguards system and increases the escalation dynamics re-
lated to Iran’s nuclear program. I will therefore focus the re-
mainder of this talk on the question how scientific  research
could contribute to closing the verification gap. The goal is to
provide the IAEA inspectors with tools for remote detection of
clandestine nuclear-weapons-materials production.
Ever since Iraq’s clandestine nuclear program shocked the
non-proliferation community in 1990,  the IAEA tried to im-
prove its nuclear safeguards system. First, the major 93+2 pro-
gram was set up. It resulted in the 1997 Additional Protocol.
Although it expanded the legal basis for more comprehensive
safeguards activities, hardly anything has so far been achieved
in providing the IAEA with technical means to detect clandes-
tine activities from a distance. Environmental sampling is re-
stricted to the locations that are routinely visited by inspectors
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anyway. Satellite imagery has been demonstrated as a power-
ful tool to detect clandestine facilities. Consequently, the IAEA
established  an  analysis  unit  for  satellite  imagery.  However,
this tool is used mainly for investigation of known facilities, in
particular for preparing inspections and for verifying building
outlines as compared to those stated in facility declarations.
Though uranium enrichment facilities have a few features that
can be observed in satellite imagery (size of buildings, heat gen-
eration), this technology is not at all capable of providing an
indication of clandestine plutonium separation. 
In 1997 and 1998, a technical  committee was brought to-
gether by the IAEA in order to study the technical possibilities
of  Wide  Area  Environmental  Sampling  (WAES)  under  the
NPT  Additional  Protocol.  The  committee  concluded  that
WAES was not feasible due to the enormous costs. According
to this study, a network of monitoring stations with 25 km grid
size, operating continuously, would be needed to cover rele-
vant parts of the globe. Even if regions which lack the required
infrastructure for clandestine reprocessing facilities were omit-
ted, the whole system would require thousands of expensive
detectors. The report of the technical committee was printed
by the IAEA but has never been released to the public, although
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it is often referred to and even quoted in publications by ex-
perts who had served as committee members.
In spite of the lack of transparency, the following became
known  about  the  study:  The  simulation  methods  applied
were outdated  and  the  study  was  clearly  biased  against
WAES; accordingly, the conclusion was that WAES is infeasible.
The requirements on WAES defined by the study were far too
demanding. New sensor technologies were not taken into ac-
count. In particular the ultra-sensitive trace analysis of kryp-
ton-85 allows for a radical cost reduction.
Progress  in  safeguards methodologies  based on environ-
mental sampling is not only urgently needed with regard to
the Model Additional Safeguards Protocol related to the NPT.
It would at the same time address verification issues for a Fis-
sile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). For both treaties, further
scientific-technical work is required and would support politi-
cal progress in non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear
weapons. Even without a formal agreement, it would be high-
ly beneficial  to develop and demonstrate verification means
that could be used as national technical means or by NGOs
and independent citizens to detect clandestine nuclear activi-
ties, especially those related to fissile material production.
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Visionary thinking combined with cutting edge science and
technology  is  required  to  identify  practical  procedures  for
Wide-Area Environmental Sampling. This can only be achieved
by a group that is not bound by diplomatic constraints and
short-term approaches. 
To address this need and to support the IAEA in developing
new verification methodologies, the International Network of
Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) organ-
ized the establishment of an independent Group of Scientific
Experts (iGSE). This network of excellence is attempting to fol-
low the precedence set by the highly influential work of inde-
pendent  expert  groups  who  supported  progress  towards  a
nuclear test ban treaty in the past.
The goal for the iGSE will be to develop and demonstrate
technologies  and procedures  for  remote  sensing and other
novel  methodologies that allow detection of  clandestine nu-
clear-weapons-usable materials production. The expected out-
come will  be technical  progress  in  related verification meth-
odologies, their demonstration in field exercises, and the public
availability of new measurement results as well as of conclu-
sions that can be drawn with respect to production of pluto-
nium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) production. The uni-
que features of this project are the combination of the required
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expertise; the independence of scientists from governmental,
diplomatic  and  organizational  interests;  and  ensured  unre-
stricted publication of the results. 
The technical areas to be considered by the iGSE should
focus on the issues with the greatest urgency and the best pro-
spects for significant progress. Therefore, environmental samp-
ling is selected as the first topical focus. 
The  most  promising new sensor  technology is  the  ultra-
sensitive trace analysis of krypton-85. This radioactive isotope
is a by-product of plutonium breeding and released into the
atmosphere during chemical separation of nuclear fuel. There-
fore, it is a good indicator for plutonium separation. It will al-
low for radical  cost reductions in any concepts of  sampling
and analyzing air  for  nuclear safeguards.  The technology is
now being developed at  the  Carl  Friedrich von Weizsäcker
Center for Science and Peace Research here at the University
of Hamburg. It is based on an atom trap and, therefore, called
atom trap trace analysis (ATTA). This method is highly select-
ive and sensitive because only krypton-85 atoms are guided by
finely tuned laser beams into a trap where they are identified
by their  fluorescence quanta.  One by one they are counted.
The first such device has been built at the Argonne National
Laboratory and went operational in 1999. It is used for ground
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water and ice core dating studies and had not been previously
considered for safeguards applications. 
The research project at the University of Hamburg has two
goals. The efficiency of counting krypton-85 atoms will be in-
creased and the instrument will be optimized for applications
in the field. The main advantage of ATTA in comparison to the
traditional beta counting method is the required sample size.
In order to reach the required minimum detectable concentra-
tion with one-hour beta counting a sample volume of 100 liter
air has to be taken. This needs to be pre-processed in the field
in order to reduce the volume of the shipping container. The
pre-processing removes the noble gas fraction from the air by
cryo-adsorption. Since this requires liquid nitrogen and elec-
tric power in the field, sample taking is too expensive for large-
scale routine applications. In contrast, ATTA could be success-
fully applied to samples of 1 liter. This would be very cost-effi-
cient.  If  applied as random sampling during routine inspec-
tions, the air sampling would cause almost no additional costs.
Regarding Wide Area Environmental Sampling, the future
improvements in implementing a sampling scheme based on
ATTA could  raise  the  usefulness  and quality  of  krypton-85
sampling in  comparison to  the monitoring scheme that  was
previously studied and discarded due to its high costs.
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Shorter sampling periods could reduce the detection thresh-
olds by one order of magnitude. Mobile air samplers could be
used instead of  having stationary monitoring sites.  The mo-
bility would allow the inspection agency to undertake surprise
measurements on very short notice.
However, it still remains unclear to what extent and under
what conditions remote sampling in combination with trans-
port modeling can detect clandestine plutonium separation of
significant quantities with sufficiently high detection and low
false alarm probability. In order to evaluate this, simulation stud-
ies are under way at the University of Hamburg in cooperation
with the Max Planck Institute for Meteorology in Hamburg. 
Atmospheric transport simulations will  be used to deter-
mine optimum procedures for location-specific and wide area
environmental air sampling to detect clandestine reprocessing
activities. Based on the results on sensitivity and source attri-
bution, the inspection procedures will be optimized in order
to  achieve  maximum  detection  probability  with  optimum
source location.
It is our goal to provide the IAEA with all information and
technology required to implement this krypton-85 tracer ap-
proach and to close the safeguards gap regarding the detect-
ability of clandestine plutonium production. 
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For  detecting  unreported  production  of  highly  enriched
uranium, the task is even more challenging, because the signa-
tures  are  weaker.  This  problem will  be tackled by the Carl
Friedrich von Weizsäcker Center as well.
I hope with this example I have convinced you how scienti-
fic  contributions  could  help  to  solve  a  problem  that  could
otherwise lead to the escalation of a conflict. The Carl Fried-
rich von Weizsäcker Center intends to help closing the verifi-
cation  gap related  to  clandestine  nuclear-weapons-materials
production. Together with other new technologies and inspec-
tion procedures this will hopefully provide the IAEA with ca-
pabilities to detect any possible clandestine activities in coun-
tries like Iran. As a result, trust in verification could be gained
and that country could be permitted to use enrichment facilit-
ies for low enriched uranium (reactor fuel) and thus a further
escalation of the current nuclear conflict could be prevented
and the danger of preemptive measures could be minimized. 
These new technologies will have to be put in perspective
to the long-term goal of a nuclear weapons free world and en-
vironmental monitoring activities will play an important role
in facilitating future treaties like the proposed Nuclear Weap-
ons Convention.
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